Journal
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 36, Issue 2, Pages 247-271Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-016-9389-9
Keywords
Perception; Direct perception; Direct realism; Indirect realism; Sense experience; Sense perception; G. E. Moore; Thompson Clarke; Frank Jackson; Representationalism; Surface perception
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Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification 'directly' here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke's discussion of G. E. Moore and surface perception to answer Austin's scepticism.
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