Journal
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
Volume 146, Issue 7, Pages 1052-1066Publisher
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/xge0000323
Keywords
counterintuitive beliefs; argumentation; cultural evolution; conformist bias; prestige bias
Categories
Funding
- ASCE program [ANR-13-PDOC-0004]
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche [ANR-12-CULT0002]
- Direction Generale de l'Armement
- Swiss National Science Foundation (Ambizione) [PZ00P1_142388/1]
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (Tremplin-ERC) [ANR-16-TERC-000101]
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) [ANR-13-PDOC-0004] Funding Source: Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)
- Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) [PZ00P1_142388] Funding Source: Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF)
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Research in cultural evolution has focused on the spread of intuitive or minimally counterintuitive beliefs. However, some very counterintuitive beliefs can also spread successfully, at least in some communities-scientific theories being the most prominent example. We suggest that argumentation could be an important factor in the spread of some very counterintuitive beliefs. A first experiment demonstrates that argumentation enables the spread of the counterintuitive answer to a reasoning problem in large discussion groups, whereas this spread is limited or absent when participants can show their answers to each other but cannot discuss. A series of experiments using the technique of repeated transmission show that, in the case of the counterintuitive belief studied: (a) arguments can help spread this belief without loss; (b) conformist bias does not help spread this belief; and (c) authority or prestige bias play a minimal role in helping spread this belief. Thus, argumentation seems to be necessary and sufficient for the spread of some counterintuitive beliefs.
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