Journal
COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
Volume 111, Issue -, Pages 56-66Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2017.07.001
Keywords
Supply chain management; Agri-products; Channel leadership; Game theory
Funding
- China National Funds for Distinguished Young Scientists [71425001]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71371093]
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This paper develops two Stackelberg game models to investigate the pricing and service level decisions of a fresh agri-products supply chain consisting of one supplier, one retailer, and one third-party logistics provider and examines the impacts of channel leadership on the price and service level decisions and profits. We consider two game scenarios: the logistics provider-first scenario and the supplier-first scenario. When the cold-chain service price is exogenous, we find that when the service sensitivity is sufficiently low, each player can obtain a higher profit under the logistics provider-first scenario than under the supplier-first scenario. Counter-intuitively, for the supplier, channel leadership does not guarantee it a higher profit. When the cold-chain service price is endogenous, we find that although the relative magnitude of the supplier's and retailer's profits is changed under the supplier-first scenario, the other main results are unchanged qualitatively. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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