Journal
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 107, Issue 12, Pages 3635-3689Publisher
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151425
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Funding
- National Science Foundation [SES-1427231, SES-1056325]
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation [BR2012-068]
- William T. Grant Foundation
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [1426566, 1427231] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.
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