4.5 Article

Distributional preferences and political behavior

Journal

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Volume 155, Issue -, Pages 1-10

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.010

Keywords

Distributional preferences; Social preferences; Fair-mindedness; Self-interest impartiality; Equality; Efficiency; Redistribution; Political decisions; Voting; Party affiliation; American Life Panel (ALP); Experiment

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Funding

  1. Center for Equitable Growth (CEG) at the University of California, Berkeley

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We document the relationship between distributional preferences and voting decisions in a large and diverse sample of Americans. Using a generalized dictator game, we generate individual-level measures of fair-mindedness (the weight on oneself versus others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs. Subjects' equality-efficiency tradeoffs predict their political decisions: equality-focused subjects are more likely to have voted for Barack Obama in 2012, and to be affiliated with the Democratic Party. Our findings shed light on how American voters are motivated by their distributional preferences. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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