Journal
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Volume 96, Issue 2, Pages 399-420Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12326
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Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes (as these are understood in social psychology) directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectualself-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of humility.
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