Journal
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS
Volume 21, Issue 2, Pages 204-225Publisher
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2018.1477979
Keywords
representation; mental representation; enactivism; cognitive science
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This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the as-such and job-description problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske's views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific modeling.
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