4.1 Article

Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure

Journal

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 108, Issue -, Pages 182-205

Publisher

ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.005

Keywords

Polluted river; Cost sharing; Axiomatization; Permission values

Categories

Funding

  1. NWO [400-09-434]
  2. Shenzhen University [16QNFC45]
  3. Department of Education of Guangdong Province, China [2016WQNCX129]

Ask authors/readers for more resources

When a polluted river passes through several different regions, a challenging question is how should the costs for cleaning the river be shared among the regions. Following Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. (2012), we first show that the Upstream Equal Sharing method and the Downstream Equal Sharing method coincide with the conjunctive permission value (van den Brink and Gilles, 1996) of an associated game with a permission structure, which is obtained as the Shapley value of an associated restricted game. Two main advantages of this approach are (i) we obtain new axiomatizations of the two sharing methods based on axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value, and (ii) by applying the alternative disjunctive permission value, obtained as the Shapley value of a different restricted game, we propose the new Upstream Limited Sharing method and provide an axiomatization. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Authors

I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.

Reviews

Primary Rating

4.1
Not enough ratings

Secondary Ratings

Novelty
-
Significance
-
Scientific rigor
-
Rate this paper

Recommended

No Data Available
No Data Available