Journal
DECISION-WASHINGTON
Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 306-322Publisher
EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHING FOUNDATION-AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/dec0000079
Keywords
prisoner's dilemma; cooperation; social preferences; social value orientation
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Funding
- National Science Foundation [1530479]
- Army Research Laboratory [W911NF-13-20045]
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [1530479] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a classic decision problem where 2 players simultaneously must decide whether to cooperate or to act in their own narrow self-interest. The PD game has been used to model many naturally occurring interactive situations, at the personal, organizational, and social levels, in which there exists a tension between individual material gain and the common good. At least 2 factors may influence the emergence of cooperative behavior in this well-known collective action problem: the incentive structure of the game itself, and the intrinsic social preferences of each of the players. We present a framework that integrates these 2 factors in an effort to account for patterns of high or low cooperation from repeated choice interactions. In an experiment using a collection of different PD games, and a measure of individual social preferences, we identify regions of PD games in which (a) cooperation is independent of social preferences; (b) nice people can be exploited; and (c) being nice is consistently rewarded.
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