Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (CCS'18)
Volume -, Issue -, Pages 1383-1396Publisher
ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
DOI: 10.1145/3243734.3243846
Keywords
5G standard; authentication protocols; AKA protocol; symbolic verification; formal analysis
Funding
- EUs Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under ERC [645865-SPOOC]
- Huawei Singapore Research Center
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available