Journal
TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME
Volume 22, Issue 2, Pages 166-186Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s12117-018-9330-2
Keywords
Organized crime; Violence; Turbulence; Extra-legal governance; Colombia
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Funding
- Department of Social Science, Universita degli Studi di Napoli Federico II
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Organized crime groups (OCGs) fight against each other even if it harms their businesses and exposes them to law enforcement authorities. Why do some groups refrain from fighting, while others operate in the incessantly violent underworld? To explain this puzzle, we propose that the underworld conflict is related to the strategies of extra-legal governance adopted by OCGs. We suggest that such strategies have origins in the availability of resources within the groups reach at their entrance into the underworld. More specifically, OCGs with access to easily extractable resources develop limited governance, which leaves them vulnerable to internal and external challenges. OCGs without access to easily extractable resources invest in extended governance, reducing their risk of underworld conflict. This article illustrates this hypothesis in the comparative case study of the Colombian organized crime, supported by new quantitative data.
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