Journal
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 21, Issue 2, Pages -Publisher
WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400115
Keywords
First-mover advantage; second-mover advantage; partial commitment; subgame perfection
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To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a canonical extension, which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.
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