Towards Privacy-preserving Incentive for Mobile Crowdsensing Under An Untrusted Platform

Reverse auction-based incentive mechanisms have been commonly proposed to stimulate mobile users to participate in crowdsensing, where users submit bids to the platform to compete for tasks. Recent works pointed out that bid is a private information which can reveal sensitive information of users (e.g., location privacy), and proposed bid-preserving mechanisms with differential privacy against inference attack. However, all these mechanisms rely on a trusted platform, and would fail in bid protection completely when the platform is untrusted (e.g., honest-hut-curious). In this paper, we focus on the bid protection problem in mobile crowdsensing with an untrusted platform, and propose a novel privacy-preserving incentive mechanism to protect users' true bids against the honest-but-curious platform while minimizing the social cost of winner selection. To this end, instead of uploading the true hid to the platform, a differentially private hid obfuscation function is designed with the exponential mechanism, which helps each user to obfuscate bids locally and submit obfuscated task-bid pairs to the platform. The winner selection problem with the obfuscated task-bid pairs is lOrmulated as an integer linear programming problem and proved to be NP-hard. We consider the optimization problem at two different scenarios, and propose a solution based on Hungarian method for single measurement and a greedy solution for multiple measurements, respectively. The proposed incentive mechanism is proved to satisfy epsilon-differential privacy, individual rationality and gamma-truthfulness. The extensive experiments on a real-world data set demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism against the untrusted platform.