Journal
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 109, Issue 11, Pages 3929-3952Publisher
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181480
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Funding
- NSF [SES-0720753, SES-0924780, SES-1225779, SES-1558857]
- Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS)
- C. V. Starr Center
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We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies represent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.
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