Journal
SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 17, Issue 4, Pages 993-1020Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwx029
Keywords
risk; regulation; labor law; capitalism; varieties of; Europe; welfare state
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Funding
- 'Open Research Area (ORA) for the Social Sciences' programme by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/K006169/1]
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR, France)
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, Germany)
- Nederlands Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO, Netherlands)
- ESRC [ES/K006169/1] Funding Source: UKRI
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This article tests the extent to which the organization and stringency of occupational health and safety regulation complements the dominant mode of coordination in the political economy. While the UK explicitly sanctions risk-cost-benefit trade-offs, other European countries mandate ambitious safety goals. That contrast appears to reflect cleavages identified in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which suggests worker protection regimes are stronger in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies. Our analysis of Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands, shows that the varied organization of their regulatory regimes is explained through a three-way complementarity with their welfare systems and modes of coordination. However, despite varied headline goals, we find no systematic differences in the stringency of those countries' regulatory protections insofar as they all make trade-offs on safety. Instead, the explicitness, rationalizations and logics of trade-offs vary according to each country's legal system, state tradition and coupling between regulation and welfare system.
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