Journal
TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Volume 12, Issue 4, Pages 1294-1305Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/tops.12448
Keywords
Cognitive mechanisms; Causal explanations; Cognitive neuroscience; Circular explanation; Galilean psychology
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Funding
- European Research Council [ERC-2015-AdG-694722]
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Few articles in psychology and cognitive neuroscience do without the promise to get into the mechanisms underlying particular psychological phenomena. And yet the progress in our mechanistic understanding of human cognition and behavior must be considered disappointing: Most explanations merely classify the phenomenon under investigation as falling into a broader category of (not any better understood) phenomena, specify the context conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to occur, or specify a particular kind of neural activity (such as the activation of a particular brain area) that is correlated with the phenomenon. None of these meets the criteria of a truly mechanistic explanation, which needs to account for phenomena in terms of a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization (Bechtel, 2006). This contribution characterizes the problem and some of its implications and discusses possible solutions.
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