Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
Volume 15, Issue -, Pages 2320-2335Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2928624
Keywords
Perturbation methods; Power grids; Computational modeling; Impedance; IEEE Standards; Meters; Power grids; cyber-physical system; false data injection attack; moving target defense; completeness; optimal protection
Funding
- National Key Research and Development Program of China [2016YFB0800204]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61833015]
- Singapore University of Technology and Design-Zhejiang University Innovation, Design and Entrepreneurship Alliance (SUTD-ZJU IDEA) [201805]
- Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Internal Funding-Start-up Grant (SUG)-the College of Engineering (CoE) [M4082287]
- A*STAR- Nanyang Technological University-Singapore University of Technology and Design AI Partnership [RGANS1906]
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Recent studies have considered thwarting false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in power grids by proactively perturbing branch susceptances. This approach is known as moving target defense (MTD). However, despite of the deployment of MTD, it is still possible for the attacker to launch stealthy FDI attacks generated with former branch susceptances. In this paper, we prove that, an MTD has the capability to thwart all FDI attacks constructed with former branch susceptances only if (i) the number of branches in the power system is not less than twice that of the system states branches, which cover all buses, are perturbed. Moreover, we prove that the state variable of a bus that is only connected by a single branch (no matter it is perturbed or not) can always be modified by the attacker. Nevertheless, in order to reduce the attack opportunities of potential attackers, we first exploit the impact of the susceptance perturbation magnitude on the dimension of the stealthy attack space, in which the attack vector is constructed with former branch susceptances. Then, we propose that, by perturbing an appropriate set of branches, we can minimize the dimension of the stealthy attack space and maximize the number of covered buses. Besides, we consider the increasing operation cost caused by the activation of MTD. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations to illustrate our findings with IEEE standard test power systems.
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