Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
Volume 176, Issue -, Pages 489-511Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.010
Keywords
Moral hazard; Monitoring; Remote work; Field experiment
Categories
Funding
- NSF Expeditions CompSustNet: Expanding the Horizons of Computational Sustainability [CCF-1522054]
- NSF [0832782, 1059284, 1522054]
- ARO [W911-NF-14-1-0498]
- Center on Global Transformation at UC San Diego
- Policy Design and Evaluation Lab at UC San Diego
- Atkinson Center for a Sustainable Future's Academic Venture Fund
- Australian Aid through the AusAID Development Research Awards Scheme
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Credible monitoring of remote workers presents unique challenges that may reduce the benefits of formal organization for their management. We consider whether increasing the salience of monitor productivity without changing incentive contracts or monitoring technology leads to changes in remote worker performance. Results from a field experiment run among multi-dimensional task workers in Kenya demonstrate that increasing the visibility of monitor activity improves performance on task dimensions not being directly paid for. Our evidence is consistent with the importance of conspicuous monitoring when managers and workers are not co-located. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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