Journal
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Volume 57, Issue 4, Pages 859-889Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09744-z
Keywords
Differentiation; Price discrimination; Retail pricing; Strategic obfuscation
Categories
Funding
- European Research Council [340903]
- Agricultural and Food Research Initiative (NIFA, USDA)
- European Research Council (ERC) [340903] Funding Source: European Research Council (ERC)
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Consumer-product manufacturers-and retailers that sell their products-often sell slightly differentiated items for reasons other than appealing to heterogeneous tastes-different sizes of a popular brand, or different flavors in a common product line for instance. We argue that this practice is a form of strategic obfuscation, which is intended to make price-comparison more difficult, and thereby raise margins on non-comparable products. We test our hypothesis with the use of examples from consumer-packaged good categories in German and French retail scanner data. We find that-after controlling for other explanations for how margins can vary with package size and type-we cannot rule out strategic obfuscation as a feature of our retail sales data.
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