Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Volume 16, Issue 4, Pages 2340-2349Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TWC.2017.2663430
Keywords
Wireless networking; mobile cloud computing; radio-as-a-service (RaaS); auction mechanism; truthfulness; pricing and resource allocation
Funding
- NSF [1443966]
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr [1443966] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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We envision that in the near future, just as Infrastructure-as-a-Service, radios, and radio resources in a wireless network can also be provisioned as a service to mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), which we refer to as Radioas- a-Service (RaaS). A major obstacle for wide adoption of RaaS is the lack of incentives and fairness for allocating radio resources among MVNOs. In this paper, we present a novel auction-based model to enable fair pricing and fair resource allocation according to real-time needs of MVNOs for RaaS. Based on the proposed model, we study the auction mechanism design with the objective of maximizing social welfare. First, we present an integer linear programming and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based auction mechanism for obtaining optimal social welfare. To reduce time complexity, we present a polynomialtime greedy mechanism for the RaaS auction. Both methods have been formally shown to be truthful and individually rational. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed greedy auction mechanism can quickly produce close-to-optimal solutions. Furthermore, to prevent winning bidders from making 0 payment, we introduce reserve prices, and present auction mechanisms with reserve prices, which are shown to be truthful and individually rational too.
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