Never Forget Where You Started: To Prevent Pre-Retirement Corruption at China's State-Owned Enterprises

The current study analyzes pre-retirement corruption among executives at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on the current institutional system of China from the perspective of expected utility, discussing the influence relationship of power utility and material desire utility. We conduct an empirical study to verify this theoretical assumption, finding that pre-retirement corruption among senior executives is significantly affected by a decline in social influence, which can significantly cause inflation in the material desires of executives at SOEs. The Chinese government's anti-corruption activities and regulations on SOEs evidently have an inhibitory effect on pre-retirement corruption. Additional social posts by executives have no effect on the inflation of material desire. Based on our theoretical assumptions and empirical study, we also discuss how to prevent pre-retirement corruption among senior executives at SOEs in China.

Automated summary

This study analyzes pre-retirement corruption among executives at state-owned enterprises in China from the perspective of expected utility, finding that a decline in social influence significantly affects corruption behavior. The Chinese government's anti-corruption activities and regulations have a clear inhibitory effect on pre-retirement corruption, while additional social posts by executives do not lead to an inflation of material desire.