Husserl's Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl's philosophy of non-intuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl's account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term signitive too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls empty intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl's alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy.

Automated summary

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl's philosophy of non-intuitive intentions through analyzing his adjustments to the theory of non-intuitive acts in 1901 and 1913/14, providing insights into a larger shift in his philosophical thinking.