A Consideration of Radioxenon Detections Around the Korean Peninsula

The detection of radioxenon isotopes from an underground nuclear test using the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is complicated by a radioxenon background, largely originating from the civil radioxenon emissions of medical isotope production facilities and nuclear power plant reactors. Much of the background is measured as single isotopes near the detection threshold, limiting the use of isotopic ratios which could differentiate between the possible sources. Here we introduce the UK Radionuclide National Data Centre methodology to approach the problem of radioxenon detections and source identification. Using automated analysis of radiometric data and atmospheric transport simulations, the detectability of radioxenon isotopes Xe-133, Xe-131m, Xe-133m and Xe-135 from North Korea is estimated for the Takasaki radionuclide station JPX38, and the possibility of detecting Xe-133 from selected locations across the Korean Peninsula and extended region is investigated.

Automated summary

The study introduces the methodology of the UK Radionuclide National Data Centre to address the detection and source identification of radioxenon, using automated analysis of radiometric data and atmospheric transport simulations. The research estimates the detectability of radioxenon isotopes from North Korea and other selected regions, providing insights into the detection capabilities across different areas.