Definable Conditionals

The variably strict analysis of conditionals does not only largely dominate the philosophical literature, since its invention by Stalnaker and Lewis, it also found its way into linguistics and psychology. Yet, the shortcomings of Lewis-Stalnaker's account initiated a plethora of modifications, such as non-vacuist conditionals, presuppositional indicatives, perfect conditionals, or other conditional constructions, for example: reason relations, difference-making conditionals, counterfactual dependency, or probabilistic relevance. Many of these new connectives can be treated as strengthened or weakened conditionals. They aredefinable conditionals. This article develops a technique to infer the logic for such definable conditionals from the known logic of the underlying defining conditional. The technique is applied to central examples. The results show that a large part of the zoo of conditionals arises from a basic conditional-a constant nucleus of the different contextual and conceptual variations of variably strict conditionals.

Automated summary

The variably strict analysis of conditionals, originated by Stalnaker and Lewis, not only dominates the philosophical literature, but has also been applied in linguistics and psychology. Modifications have been made to address the shortcomings of the Lewis-Stalnaker account, resulting in various new forms of conditionals and conditional constructions. These new connectives can be seen as either strengthened or weakened conditionals, stemming from a basic conditional nucleus.