Journal
REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
Volume 15, Issue 3, Pages 686-708Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/rego.12350
Keywords
experimentalist governance; forest governance; regulation; timber legality; transnational governance
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This paper examines the interactions between public and private components of the emerging transnational timber legality regime, highlighting the productive role of the EU FLEGT initiative in fostering cooperation and shared commitment. The study finds that the regime remains decentralized and polyarchic, with mechanisms such as cross-referencing, peer review, and public oversight facilitating horizontal integration and coordination without the need for a hegemonic power.
This paper analyzes the interactions between the separate components of the emerging transnational timber legality regime, both public and private. It examines how far, and through what institutional mechanisms, these interactions are producing a joined-up transnational regime, based on a shared normative commitment to combat illegal logging and cooperative efforts to implement and enforce it. The paper argues that the experimentalist architecture of the EU FLEGT initiative has fostered productive, mutually reinforcing interactions both with public timber legality regulation in other consumer countries and with private certification schemes. But this emerging regime remains highly polyarchic, with broad scope for autonomous initiatives by NGOs and private service providers, along with national governments, international organizations, and multi-donor partnerships. Hence horizontal integration and coordination within it depend on a series of institutional mechanisms, some of which are distinctively experimentalist, while others can also be found in more conventional regimes. These mechanisms include cross-referencing and reciprocal endorsement of rules and standards; recursive learning through information pooling and peer review of implementation experience; public oversight and joint assessment of private certification and legality verification schemes; and the penalty default effect of public legality regulation in consumer countries, which have pushed both exporting countries and transnational firms to comply with the norms and procedures of the emerging transnational regime. The paper's findings thus provide robust new evidence for the claim advanced in previous work that a joined-up transnational regime can be assembled piece by piece under polyarchic conditions through coordinated learning from decentralized experimentation, without a hegemonic power to impose common global rules.
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