4.5 Article

Do industrial pollution activities in China respond to ecological fiscal transfers? Evidence from payments to national key ecological function zones

Journal

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Volume 64, Issue 7, Pages 1184-1203

Publisher

ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/09640568.2020.1813695

Keywords

ecological fiscal transfers; performance-based payments; opportunity costs; moral hazards; China

Funding

  1. National Social Science Foundation of China [17VZL002]
  2. China talent project/The transformation and development of China's economy based on the perspective of innovation-driven
  3. National Natural Science Foundation of China [41901141]
  4. Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies/Chey Institute for Advanced Studies International Scholar Exchange Fellowship for the academic year of 2018-1019

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The policy of payments to National Key Ecological Function Zones (NKEFZs) aimed to reduce industrial pollution in China has been found effective in reducing pollution-intensive activities. However, the selective implementation of the policy may lead to issues, such as weaker efforts in reducing pollution in downstream areas with higher opportunity costs. Additionally, there may be challenges such as suppressing air-polluting industries but not water-polluting industries, and moral hazards due to information asymmetry in pollution reduction.
The policy of payments to National Key Ecological Function Zones (NKEFZs), a type of instrument for Ecological Fiscal Transfers, has been introduced in China. We employed propensity score matching and difference in difference estimation to investigate the effectiveness of this policy on the reduction of industrial pollution. We found evidence that the policy had reduced pollution-intensive activity in the NKEFZs. Meanwhile, implementation of the policy had been selective. First, the downstream NKEFZs with higher opportunity costs had lower efforts to reduce industrial pollution. Because performance-based payment mechanisms neglect opportunity costs, financial stress weakens the efforts to reduce pollution. Secondly, the NKEFZs policy suppresses air-polluting industries but not water-polluting industries. Local governments may reduce only the target pollutant (chemical oxygen demand) while ignoring non-target pollutants. There may be moral hazards under information asymmetry in pollution reduction.

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