Political Scandal: A Theory

We study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the parties that work with him. In the model, both authentic and fake scandals arise endogenously within a political framework involving two parties that trade off benefits of continued collaboration with a suspect politician against the possibility of reputational fallout. Rising polarization between the two parties, we show, increases the likelihood of scandal while decreasing its informational value. Scandals that are triggered by only the opposing party, we also find, are reputationally damaging to both parties and, in some instances, reputationally enhancing to the politician. The model also reveals that jurisdictions with lots of scandals are not necessarily beset by more misbehavior. Under well-defined conditions, in fact, scandals can be a sign of political piety.

Automated summary

Our study of a model reveals that increasing polarization between two parties raises the chances of scandals occurring, yet diminishes their informative content. Scandals instigated solely by the opposing party are found to harm the reputation of both parties, though may boost the politician's reputation in some cases. Additionally, our model shows that jurisdictions with high occurrences of scandals do not necessarily indicate more misconduct, suggesting that scandals may actually signify political integrity under certain conditions.