Impossible fictions part II: Lessons for mind, language, and epistemology

Impossible fictions have lessons to teach us about linguistic representation, about mental content and concepts, and about uses of conceivability in epistemology. An adequate theory of impossible fictions may require theories of meaning that can distinguish between different impossibilities; a theory of conceptual truth that allows us to make useful sense of a variety of conceptual falsehoods; and a theory of our understanding of necessity and possibility that permits impossibilities to be conceived. After discussing these questions, strategies for resisting the picture of impossible fictions presented here and in Part I are discussed. Perhaps apparently impossible fictions describe possibilities after all; or perhaps impossible fictions are all trivial; or perhaps some apparently intelligible impossible fictions are unintelligible after all.

Automated summary

Impossible fictions can teach us about linguistic representation, mental content and concepts, and the use of conceivability in epistemology. A theory of impossible fictions may require a theory of meaning, conceptual truth, and understanding of necessity and possibility. Strategies for resisting the concept of impossible fictions are also discussed, considering whether they describe possibilities, are all trivial, or are unintelligible.