Biological normativity: a new hope for naturalism?

Since Boorse [Philos Sci 44(4):542-573, 1977] published his paper Health as a theoretical concept one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine has been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense 'objective' and 'value-free' or 'subjective' and 'value-laden'. Due to the apparent 'failure' of pure naturalist, constructivist, or normativist accounts, much in the recent literature has appealed to more conciliatory approaches or so-called 'hybrid accounts' of health and disease. A recent paper by Matthewson and Griffiths [J Med Philos 42(4):447-466, 2017], however, may bear the seeds for the revival of purely naturalist approach to health and disease. In this paper, I defend their idea of Biological Normativity against recent criticism by Schwartz [J Med Philos Forum Bioethics Philos Med 42(4):485-502, 2017] and hope to help it flower into a revival of naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine.

Automated summary

Since 1977, there has been a lively debate in the philosophy of medicine on whether health and disease are 'objective' and 'value-free' or 'subjective' and 'value-laden'. Recent literature has shown a trend towards more conciliatory and hybrid approaches, but some are now looking to revive purely naturalist approaches in this field.