Journal
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 40, Issue 3, Pages 597-608Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-020-09735-w
Keywords
Habits; Ryle; Intellectualism; Dreyfus; Dewey; Pragmatism
Categories
Funding
- ARC [DP170102987]
- JSPS KAKENHI [20K00001]
- Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [20K00001] Funding Source: KAKEN
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Habitual actions exhibit intelligence through shaping perception, forming an interrelated network among themselves, and cooperating with the environment to promote intelligent behavior.
Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey's pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available