4.2 Article

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch

Journal

PHYSICAL REVIEW RESEARCH
Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages -

Publisher

AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.3.013076

Keywords

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Funding

  1. Office of Naval Research (ONR)
  2. Ontario Research Fund (Ontario Research Fund)
  3. Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
  4. Industry Canada
  5. Huawei Technologies Canada Co., Ltd.

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Traditional quantum key distribution protocols assume equal detection efficiency of all physical detectors, but in practical scenarios, detector efficiency mismatch may exist. Researchers have developed a method to consider detection efficiency mismatch without restricting adversary attack strategies, and this method is directly applicable to practical situations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations. The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency. However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors. A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatial-temporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector. Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption. Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary. Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations. We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes. In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed. For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption. Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.

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