Experimentalist Governance with Interactive Central-Local Relations: Making New Pension Policies in China

Although regional policy experimentation has become a global trend, the distinct features of experimentalist governance in a given country, such as China, remains to be investigated. This article extends policy process theory by proposing the framework of experimentalist governance with interactive central-local relations or Chinese-style experimentalist governance, which combines three features. First, policy goals and instruments are formed separately and interactively by the central and local governments. Second, the central government is burdened with its own concerns about policy performance for maintaining authority and legitimacy. Third, the evaluation of policy pilots relies primarily on the responses of local governments. We further conceptualize three new patterns of experimentalist governance in China, namely, comparative trial, selective recognition, and adaptive reconciliation, in addition to hierarchical experimentation. These patterns are illustrated with case studies on four pension policies in China, which are for public sector employees, urban employees, rural residents, and migrant workers.

Automated summary

This article investigates the distinct features of experimentalist governance in China, proposing a framework that combines central-local interactive relations. The central government's concerns for policy performance and the reliance on local responses for policy evaluation are highlighted. Three new patterns of experimentalist governance in China are conceptualized, illustrated through case studies on pension policies for different groups.