Journal
IEEE ACCESS
Volume 9, Issue -, Pages 29641-29659Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3058628
Keywords
Security; Smart grids; Transmission line measurements; Servers; Control systems; Time measurement; Sensors; Cyber-physical power system; cyber-physical security; false data injection; dynamic watermarking; moving target defense
Categories
Funding
- U.S. National Science Foundation [1929147]
- U.S. Department of Energy [DE-EE0008767]
- Office Of The Director
- Office of Integrative Activities [1929147] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid have led to the development of new devices, but also increased the vulnerability to cyber-physical attacks. By focusing on the physical layer of the smart grid, researchers have presented various defense approaches to combat these attacks. Current state-of-the-art techniques include moving target defense, watermarking, and data-driven methods for enhancing cyber-physical security in the smart grid.
Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) have enabled a broad range of new devices based on the information and communication technology (ICT). However, these ICT-enabled devices are susceptible to a growing threat of cyber-physical attacks. This paper performs a thorough review of the state-of-the-art cyber-physical security of the smart grid. By focusing on the physical layer of the CPSG, this paper provides an abstracted and unified state-space model, in which cyber-physical attack and defense models can be effectively generalized. The existing cyber-physical attacks are categorized in terms of their target components. We then discuss several operational and informational defense approaches that present the current state-of-the-art in the field, including moving target defense, watermarking, and data-driven approaches. Finally, we discuss challenges and future opportunities associated with the smart grid cyber-physical security.
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