On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Automated summary

This article discusses the debate between dual-process and single-process thinking models, arguing that there is currently no sufficient evidence to settle this debate, and even if it were resolved, it would not advance psychologists' understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.