Depth as Nemesis: Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Depth in Phenomenology of Perception, Art and Politics

The concept of depth is central to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and informed not only his philosophy of perception but also his thinking about psychology, art and politics. This article traces the ways the notion of depth appears in Merleau-Ponty's thinking in these fields, contrasting it with Husserl's own phenomenological investigations. The article starts with a comparison of the function of perception in Husserl's phenomenology and then proceeds with an analysis of how the issue of depth reappears in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, phenomenology of art and political philosophy. I argue that while Husserl's approach to phenomenology led him to analyses of aesthetics stemming from works of art as random examples, and to non-participation in politics, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology leads to the opposite approach, inviting concrete criticism in art and active participation in politics. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty's approach is more philosophically consistent. The choice of particular works of art, and the particular political engagements, can retrospectively clarify the transcendental phenomenological investigations themselves.

Automated summary

This article explores the concept of depth in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and its implications for perception, art, and politics, contrasting with Husserl's phenomenological inquiries. It argues that Merleau-Ponty's approach leads to concrete criticism in art and active engagement in politics, in contrast to Husserl's more detached stance. The choice of specific artworks and political involvements can retrospectively illuminate the transcendental phenomenological investigations themselves.