Working for the Machine: Patronage Jobs and Political Services in Argentina

Conventional wisdom posits that patronage jobs are distributed to supporters in exchange for political services. But why would public employees comply with the agreement and provide political services after receiving the job? Departing from existing explanations, I argue that patronage employees engage in political activities because their jobs are tied to their patrons' political survival. Supporters' jobs will be maintained by the incumbent, but not by the opposition. Supporters, then, have incentives to help the incumbent, which makes their original commitment to provide political services a credible one. Using survey experiments embedded in a survey of 1,200 Argentine public employees, I show that patronage employees are involved in political activities and that they believe their jobs are tied to the political success of the incumbent.

Automated summary

Conventional wisdom suggests that patronage jobs are given to supporters in exchange for political services, but in reality, public employees engage in political activities because their jobs are tied to the political survival of their patrons, which gives them the incentive to help the incumbent. This study, conducted with 1,200 Argentine public employees, shows that patronage employees are actively involved in politics and believe that their jobs are linked to the success of the incumbent.