Journal
BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Volume 30, Issue 7, Pages 2980-2995Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/bse.2783
Keywords
exploitative innovation; exploratory innovation; game theory; optimal decision; supply chain coordination; sustainable innovation
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This study examines a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in an environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. Five different contract types are studied, and it is demonstrated that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can achieve coordination in a fragmented supply chain, assisting managers to optimize decisions based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help decision-makers make investment decisions in ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different contract structures.
This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures.
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