Multi Label Deep Learning classification approach for False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid

The smart grid replaces the traditional power structure with information inventiveness that contributes to a new physical structure. In such a field, malicious information injection can potentially lead to extreme results. Incorrect, FDI attacks will never be identified by typical residual techniques for false data identification. Most of the work on the detection of FDI attacks is based on the linearized power system model DC and does not detect attacks from the AC model. Also, the overwhelming majority of current FDIA recognition approaches focus on FDIA, whilst significant injection location data cannot be achieved. Building on the continuous developments in deep learning, we propose a Deep Learning based Locational Detection technique to continuously recognize the specific areas of FDIA. In the development area solver gap happiness is a False Data Detector (FDD) that incorporates a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). The FDD is established enough to catch the fake information. As a multi-label classifier, the following CNN is utilized to evaluate the irregularity and cooccurrence dependency of power flow calculations due to the possible attacks. There are no earlier statistical assumptions in the architecture proposed, as they are model-free. It is also cost-accommodating since it does not alter the current FDD framework and it is only several microseconds on a household computer during the identification procedure. We have shown that ANN-MLP, SVM-RBF, and CNN can conduct locational detection under different noise and attack circumstances through broad experience in IEEE 14, 30, 57, and 118 bus systems. Moreover, the multi-name classification method used successfully improves the precision of the present identification.

Automated summary

The smart grid's innovation in replacing the traditional power structure with information creativity poses risks of extreme outcomes from malicious information injection. However, most current methods for detecting FDI attacks are limited to linearized DC power system models and fail to address attacks in AC models, highlighting the need for further development in this area.