Journal
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Volume 65, Issue 2, Pages 500-511Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqaa081
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When actors catch a state engaging in objectionable secret actions, they face a dilemma of whether to expose it or not, which can lead to unintended consequences such as escalation or reduced engagement in secret actions due to opponents' willingness to expose them.
When an actor catches a state taking an objectionable secret action, it faces a dilemma. Exposing the action could force unresolved states to terminate the behavior to save face. However, it could also provoke resolved states to double down on the activity now that others are aware of the infraction. We develop a model that captures this fundamental trade-off. Three main results emerge. First, the state and its opponent may engage in a form of collusion-opponents do not expose resolved states despite their distaste for the behavior. Second, when faced with uncertainty, the opponent may mistakenly expose a resolved type and induce escalation, leading the opponent to have ex post regret. Finally, as the strength of secret action increases, states may engage in it less often. This counterintuitive result is a consequence of the opponent's greater willingness to expose, which deters less resolved types.
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