4.6 Article

Information manipulation in equity crowdfunding markets

Journal

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE
Volume 67, Issue -, Pages -

Publisher

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101866

Keywords

Equity crowdfunding; Entrepreneurial finance; Signaling theory; Observational learning; Information cascades; Social finance; Digital finance

Funding

  1. Ghent University

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In digital finance markets, investors have the option to withdraw their bids during a cooling-off period, which can potentially manipulate information and enhance the success of offerings. Dataset analysis shows that platform members tend to invest in low-quality offerings, influencing campaign dynamics and increasing subsequent bids.
In digital finance markets, investors can withdraw their non-binding bids within a cooling-off period. As the bids are visible online, we argue that this option can be used to manipulate the information available to investors. Previous research indeed shows that early bids attract later investors and trigger information cascades, thereby enhancing the chances of success of the offerings. Using a dataset of 3564 investment lines, we observe frequent (10.2%) investment withdrawals before the end of the offerings. Platform members invested in 64% and later withdrew from 30% of the offerings listed in their portal, being 1.85 times more likely to withdraw than the average crowdfunding investor. We document that their investments take place predominantly in low-quality offerings and influence the campaign dynamics, increasing the number of subsequent bids.

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