Journal
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH
Volume 26, Issue 18, Pages 17918-17926Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s11356-017-0891-4
Keywords
Carbon emission reduction; Pollution; Government regulations; Traditional technology; Innovative technology; Nash equilibrium
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [71571151, 71371159]
- National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science of China [14AGL015]
Ask authors/readers for more resources
This paper shifts the discussion of low-carbon technology from science to the economy, especially the reactions of a manufacturer to government regulations. One major concern in this paper is uncertainty about the effects of government regulation on the manufacturing industry. On the trust side, will manufacturers trust the government's commitment to strictly supervise carbon emission reduction? Will a manufacturer that is involved in traditional industry consciously follow a low-carbon policy? On the profit side, does equilibrium between a manufacturer and a government exist on deciding which strategy to undertake to meet a profit maximization objective under carbon emission reduction? To identify the best solutions to these problems, this paper estimates the economic benefits of manufacturers associated with policy regulations in a low-carbon technology market. The problem of an interest conflict between the government and the manufacturer is formalized as a game theoretic model, and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is derived and analyzed. The experiment results indicate that when the punishment levied on the manufacturer or the loss to the government is sizable, the manufacturer will be prone to developing innovative technology and the government will be unlikely to supervise the manufacturer.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available