Journal
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
Volume 16, Issue 3, Pages 881-909Publisher
ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
DOI: 10.3982/TE4137
Keywords
Market design; school choice; manipulability
Categories
Funding
- Basic Research Programof the National Research University Higher School of Economics
- Russian Foundation for Basic Research [19-01-00762, 20-01-00687]
- European commission, Marie Sklodowska-Curie individual fellowship [890648]
- Marie Curie Actions (MSCA) [890648] Funding Source: Marie Curie Actions (MSCA)
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The reformed rules are less prone to gaming and each reform expands the set of schools wherein each student can never get admission by manipulation.
Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms, the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that the rules used after the reforms are less prone to gaming according to a criterion called strategic accessibility: each reformexpands the set of schools wherein each student can never get admission by manipulation. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and Sonmez (2013) is incomplete.
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