Journal
JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Volume 45, Issue 3, Pages 439-477Publisher
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1759038
Keywords
Artificial intelligence; U; S; -China relations; nuclear security; deterrence policy; emerging technology; strategic stability
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This article analyzes the impact of AI on the strategic decision-making process and discusses the risks and trade-offs of delegating military force to machines. It argues that substituting human critical thinking and intuition with AI can be fundamentally destabilizing, and also considers the use of AI-enhanced social media by non-state and state proxy actors.
Will the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines? How might non-nuclear state and non-state actors leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article analyzes the impact of strategic stability of the use of AI in the strategic decision-making process, in particular, the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines. It argues that AI-enabled decision support tools, by substituting the role of human critical thinking, empathy, creativity, and intuition in the strategic decision-making process, will be fundamentally destabilizing if defense planners come to view AI's 'support' function as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities and human analysis and decision-making. The article also considers the nefarious use of AI-enhanced fake news, deepfakes, bots, and other forms of social media by non-state actors and state proxy actors, which might cause states to exaggerate a threat from ambiguous or manipulated information, increasing instability.
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