The Real Myth of Coherence

In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes are occurrent or activated. I then argue that you are subject to a coherence requirement only if your relevant attitudes are all activated, for you are not necessarily subject to the charge of irrationality in violating a coherence requirement when your attitudes are not all activated. If so, however, you satisfy the coherence requirements whenever you are subject to them, which makes it plausible that the requirements should be seen as descriptive principles about belief and intention.

Automated summary

The coherence requirements on belief and intention are seen as descriptive principles rather than normative rules. These requirements only apply when all relevant attitudes are activated, and violating them may not necessarily lead to charges of irrationality if not all attitudes are activated.