The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral

Most theorists agree that our social order includes a distinctive legal dimension. A fundamental question is that of whether reference to specific legal phenomena always involves a commitment to a particular moral view. Whereas many philosophers advance the 'positivist' claim that any correspondence between morality and the law is just a function of political circumstance, natural law theorists insist that law is intrinsically moral. Each school claims the crucial advantage of consistency with our folk concept. Drawing on the notion of dual character concepts, we develop a set of hypotheses about the intuitive relation between a rule's moral and legal aspects. We then report a set of studies that conflict unexpectedly with the predictions by legal positivists. Intuitively, an evil rule is not a fully-fledged instance of law.

Automated summary

Most theorists agree that our social order has a distinct legal dimension. The fundamental question is whether specific legal phenomena always imply a commitment to a particular moral view. While positivists argue that the correspondence between morality and law is purely influenced by political circumstances, natural law theorists contend that law is inherently moral. Both schools claim consistency with our folk concept. This study examines the intuitive relation between the moral and legal aspects of a rule using dual character concepts and presents unexpected findings contradicting predictions made by legal positivists.