The Ineffability of Induction

My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a metaphysics can help us make progress on the problem of induction.

Automated summary

The author's first goal is to propose a distinctively metaphysical approach to solve the problem of induction. They argue that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can only justify induction by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. The second goal is to outline what such a metaphysical approach could look like, and they illustrate this through a toy case that demonstrates how metaphysics can aid in making progress on the problem of induction.