Journal
ARABIAN JOURNAL FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
Volume 47, Issue 10, Pages 13487-13498Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s13369-022-06922-2
Keywords
Evolutionary game; Building energy efficiency; Fairness theory; Risk sharing
Categories
Funding
- Fujian Provincial Department of Science and Technology [2021I0014]
- Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) [J130000.7113.05E79]
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This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and prefabricated building developers to analyze developers' energy-saving and emission-reduction behavior. The study suggests that the government should combine positive and negative incentives and take into account developers' fairness preferences and profitability in setting incentives and fees. The paper provides suggestions for the government to improve targeted incentive policies and contribute to the promotion of prefabricated buildings.
Fabricated building construction is an effective way to improve construction process, productivity, quality and cost-effectiveness. However, many developers cannot actively respond to the existing policies, so giving full play to the government's guiding role and stimulating market enthusiasm is the key to the development of prefabricated buildings. Based on fairness theory, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and prefabricated building developers. It analyses the energy-saving and emission-reduction behaviour of developers. The results show that the government should combine positive and negative incentives. Most importantly, incentives and fees should be set taking into account the developer's fairness preferences and profitability. Finally, based on the research results, this paper provides suggestions for the government to improve targeted incentive policies and contributes to the promotion of prefabricated buildings.
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