The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment

According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are, at bottom, nothing but experiential phenomena. One argument for this view proceeds from an alleged need for physical phenomena to have features beyond what physics attributes to them; another starts by arguing that consciousness is ubiquitous, and proposes an identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation of this alleged fact. The first argument assumes that physical phenomena have categorical natures, and the second that the world's experience-causing powers or potentials underdetermine its physical features. I argue that panpsychists are not entitled to these assumptions.

Automated summary

According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are fundamentally experiential phenomena. They argue that physical phenomena need to have features beyond what can be explained by physics, and propose the identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation for the ubiquity of consciousness. However, these arguments rely on assumptions that panpsychists are not entitled to make.