Lyotard, the differend and the philosophy of deep disagreement

This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues not just that his work has relevance for this debate, but that it offers a challenge to the 'epistemic paradigm' present in its academic literature, represented by the two most prominent sets of theories within it - the 'fundamental epistemic principle' and 'hinge epistemology' views, arguably most strongly represented by Michael Lynch and Duncan Pritchard, respectively. Focussing on Lyotard's text 'The Differend', I show how its conceptual framework and philosophy of language locates the cause of deep disagreement not in the epistemic realm, but in things which do not fully submit to epistemic evaluation: the radically incomplete and open nature of language, and our increasingly politically pluralistic world full of incommensurable differences that do not always admit of rational resolution. Lyotard's work calls for us to conceptualize deep disagreements as problems of politics, not epistemology, and to find new ways of dealing with disagreements that do not force a solution on them (which often comes at the cost of one party being wronged, or worse) and to create new ways of speaking so that our collective conceptual resources can be increased to better deal with specific cases of dispute. Lyotard's relevance for the philosophy of deep disagreement is also further discussed with references to Miranda Fricker's work on 'epistemic injustice', which Lyotard, in a different vocabulary, is also concerned with and analyses in 'The Differend'.

Automated summary

This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard and its relevance to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues that Lyotard challenges the prevailing epistemic paradigm in the academic literature on deep disagreement by locating the cause of deep disagreement in factors beyond the realm of knowledge, such as the incompleteness and openness of language and the incommensurable differences in our politically pluralistic world. The paper suggests conceptualizing deep disagreements as political problems rather than epistemological ones, and finding new ways of dealing with disagreements that do not impose a predetermined solution but rather increase our collective conceptual resources.