Journal
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 66, Issue 5, Pages 885-902Publisher
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1688183
Keywords
Naive realism; perceptual experience; phenomenal character; phenomenal similarity; disjunctivism
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The article refutes the accusations against naive realism, arguing that the related arguments are all unsuccessful. It highlights the problem with critiques targeting the phenomenological predictions of the view, pointing out that naive realism itself does not make necessary types of phenomenological predictions.
It has been claimed that naive realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naive realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naive realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naive realism, broadly construed, doesn't make phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naive realism, or approach matters quite differently.
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